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ABSTRACT
APPLICATION OF THE STATES-OF-MIND MODEL WITHIN RATIONAL
EMOTIVE BEHAVIOR THEORY
Lina Cherkasova

Understanding the role of positive and negative cognitions in psycho-emotional
adjustment is essential to improve the effectiveness of CBT practice. Schwartz and
Garamoni (1986; 1987) proposed a model for the dynamic relationship of negative and
positive cognitions based on the golden-section hypothesis or the optimal balance: The
States-Of-Mind Model (SOM). The model proposes an asymmetrical balance of positive
and negative cognitions represented numerically by the golden-section ratio of .62
positive to .38 negative cognitions [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions)].
To date, the SOM model has mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts
or self-statement, which represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a
person’s emotional experience (DiGiuseppe, David, & Venezia, 2016). The model has
not been used with more enduring trait like cognitive measures such as dysfunctional
attitudes, irrational beliefs, or schema. The current study tested the validity of the Statesof-Mind model (SOM) with irrational and rational beliefs of Ellis’ Rational Emotive
Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994).
This study tested the SOM ratios using REBT framework by analyzing survey
data from 221 participants on their self-reports of Rational and Irrational Beliefs
(RBs/IBs), psychopathology and life satisfaction. Past research on the SOM has
supported the presence of psychopathology in individuals whose ratios are lower than the

optimal golden-section proportion of .62 (Kendal, Howard & Hayes, 1989; Michelson,
Schwartz & Marchione, 1991). Replicating past research, lower belief SOM ratios in this
study were linked to higher levels of psychopathology. However, the optimal balance set
point of .62 was not confirmed. Our research findings support the original formulation of
Schwartz and Garamoni’s work in that individuals balance their cognitive states
asymmetrically, but the asymmetry index was higher than the theorized optimal ratio
of .62. Implications for future research and the practice of school psychology are
discussed.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The study tested the validity of the States-of-Mind model (SOM) with irrational
and rational beliefs of Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994).
The SOM model is an integrative model of positive and negative cognitions based on the
golden-section hypothesis, information processing theory, personal construct theory, and
cognitive-behaviorism (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). The model proposes that
individuals balance their cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation
system that is represented optimally by the golden-section ratio of .62 positive to .38
negative cognitions [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions)]. The goldensection balance of negative and positive cognitions is theorized to support optimal
information processing where negative cognitions are especially salient against a mostly
positive cognitive backdrop (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). Based on the model,
sustained deviation from the golden-section balance, in either positive or negative
direction, represent the presence of psychological and emotional maladjustment
(Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).
Past research on the SOM has supported the presence of psychopathology in
individuals whose ratios are significantly lower than the optimal golden-section
proportion of .62 (Kendal et al., 1989; Michelson et al., 1991); however, research has not
found support for maladjustment within the upper limits of positive proportions
(McDermut & Haaga, 1994).

On the contrary,

a linear relationship was found between

increasing positive ratios and measures of adjustment (Amsel & Fichten, 1998; Friedman,
2000).
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The SOM has mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts or selfstatement, which represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a person’s
emotional experience (DiGiuseppe et al., 2016). The model has not been used with more
enduring trait-like cognitive measures, such as dysfunctional attitudes, irrational beliefs,
or schema. I hypothesize that by assessing stable cognitive constructs, such as irrational
(IBs) and rational beliefs (RBs) within the REBT framework, we will find support for the
SOM golden-section (optimal balance) hypothesis. Moreover, REBT’s focus on the
evaluative nature of cognitions fits in with the original formulation of the golden-section
hypothesis within personal construct theory, which focused on measuring binary
judgments and evaluations rather than negative and positive cognitions (Benjafield &
Adams-Webber, 1976; Lefebvre, 1985).
To test the golden-section hypothesis within the REBT framework, we will apply
the SOM ratios to data of an adult sample who have completed the DRLG Short Form
(DiGiuseppe et al., 2020) of the Attitude and Beliefs Scale-2 (ABS-2: DiGiuseppe et al.,
2018). The DRLG was developed specifically to assess irrational and rational beliefs
within the REBT framework (DiGiuseppe, et al., 2018). The SOM ratios derived from
the DRLG were tested within the paradigm of the model and correlated with measures of
psychological dysfunction and adjustment.
The SOM model is important in applied psychology as well as the practice of
school psychology because of the model’s ability to conform to any assessment tool that
delineates between positive and negative constructs. The SOM can be applied to measure
dichotomous cognitions, affect, personality traits, or beliefs. The use of ratios allows for
the application of tracking treatment outcomes across not only assessment tools but also
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types of interventions. The utilization of the SOM paradigm with psychotherapeutic
treatment could yield information into the mechanism of change as well as styles of
information processing (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). The current study will extend
research with the SOM and its application across psychotherapeutic settings.
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Chapter II
Literature Review

Why cognitions matter in the application of psychotherapeutic treatments
The target of most cognitive psychotherapies is cognitions, thoughts, attitudes,
scheme, or beliefs that are inherently private experiences (Lubinski & Thompson, 1993).
As private events, thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes can only be measured indirectly
(DiGiuseppe et al., 2016). Despite this difficulty of measurement, the field of cognitive
behavior therapy (CBT) has a burgeoning amount of research on the efficacy of
psychotherapeutic interventions. Today CBT is considered the gold standard in
psychotherapy because of the amount of research supporting its efficacy and
effectiveness (David et al., 2018). CBTs have been shown affective on par with
pharmacological interventions in treating many psychopathologies, most notably anxiety
and mood disorders (Chiang, et al., 2017; Franklin, et al., 2015; Heuzenroeder, et al.,
2004; Kennard, et al., 2008).
In order to improve symptoms of anxiety or mood disorder, CBT therapists work
to adjust their patients’ negative cognitions, which are theorized to lead to distressing
emotions and maladaptive behaviors (DiGiuseppe et al., 2018). Negative (contributing)
and positive (protective) cognitions are seen as important aspects of the way people
organize and process information (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). Understanding the role
of positive and negative cognitions in psychological adjustment is essential to improve
the effectiveness of CBT practice. Research in this area has shown a clear link of
negative automatic thoughts and cognitive errors to psychopathology and corresponding
positive cognitions to well-being (Beck, 1963; Beevers et al., 2007; Chakhssi, et al.,
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2018; Teasdale, 1983) and the relationship of IB to disturbance and RBs to well-being
(David, Christea, & Hoffman, 2018).
The idea of considering positive and negative cognitions simultaneously was
formally introduced in the late 1980s by Schwartz and Garamoni’s SOM model (1986,
1989). They attempted to understand whether there is a dynamic relationship between
contributory (e.g., I’m worthless) and protective (e.g., I matter) cognitions when
considering the improvement of symptoms documented in CBT research.
The States of Mind Model (SOM)
The SOM model proposes that individuals balance their positive and negative
cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation system represented with a ratio
[positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions). The computation for the ratio and
the chosen ‘cut-off’ point of optimal balance was inspired by the research of Benjafield
and Adams-Webber’s golden-section hypothesis, which applied the concept of the
‘divine proportion’ and the Pythagorean notion of human internal balance to the study of
cognitive evaluation (1976). The ‘divine proportion’ is defined in mathematics as a point
on a line that divides the line so that the proportion of the smaller segment is to the larger
segment as the larger segment is to the whole, or roughly that the larger portion is 62% of
the whole. The Pythagorean notion of human internal balance proposed the idea of
perfect equilibrium, which is reached by the optimal tension of opposites within one
body.
Schwartz and Garamoni theorized that asymmetry in the computational balance
must exist within the human cognitive experience to allow a person to optimally identify
important negative events, which might prove detrimental to their well-being, against the
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backdrop of mostly positive mental events. Subsequently, they hypothesized that
psychopathology arises when the internal computational system for information
processing sustains a prolonged shift from the optimal cognitive balance. For example,
the SOM model would help identify that in depression, the overwhelming number of
negative cognitions drowns out positive events or that in mania, the lack of negative
thoughts minimizes the existence of short-comings. Overall, the idea of internal
cognitive balance is an intriguing and unique way to conceptualize cognitive information
processing as well as the mechanism of cognitive and behavioral change within CBT
treatment.
Background research that influenced the conceptualization of the SOM
The golden-section hypothesis assumes a central role in the SOM model. The
golden-section hypothesis was first proposed in the work of Benjafield and AdamsWebber. Benjafield and Adams-Webber (1976) combined the golden-section proportion
with the Pythagorean notion of balance in human experience to formulate the goldensection hypothesis. The golden-section is more famously known as the golden ratio (both
are the same mathematical concept only inversely calculated). The golden-section has
been extensively studied since the ancient Greek mathematician, Euclid, and fittingly
designated as the ‘divine proportion.’ The golden-section can be found in our everyday
life aesthetically as the proportion of books, TV screens, buildings, much of art, and
movie images (Benjafield & Adams-Webber, 1976). The second idea, essential to the
golden-section hypothesis, is the doctrine of the ancient Greek philosopher, Pythagoras.
Within the Pythagorean theory, the human body was thought to maintain a perfect
proportion of dichotomous tendencies (Benjafield & Adams-Webber, 1976). Pythagoras,

6

as described by Plato, held a belief that human experience was kept in a state of balance
through constant tension between pairs of opposites. Both the Pythagorean doctrine of
opposites and the golden-section are ideas of a tangible, perfect balance. In combining
these ideas, the golden-section lends a numerical value, and therefore a testable anchor to
the Pythagorean concept of a perfect balance of opposites within the human experience.
Benjafield and Adams-Webber (1976) tested the golden-section hypothesis by
experimentally assessing the spontaneous balance of dichotomous choice. The authors
replicated a repertory grid task, first introduced in the work on personal construct by
George Kelly (1955). The repertory grid task consists of role titles (e.g., Self, Mother,
Father, etc.) that are judged by the subject on dimensions of dichotomous adjectives (e.g.,
bold-timid, active-passive, etc.). The dichotomous adjectives are scored 0 for the
negative pole and 1 for the positive pole. Within a line segment between 0 and 1, the
golden-section falls at the value of .618. Benjafield and Adams-Webber used this
procedure in five studies. All five studies used university students to perform the
repertory grid task. In each study, participants chose the positive adjective to evaluate
themselves and others with a probability between 61% and 63%. The authors concluded
that individuals tend to organize their judgment by approximating the golden-section
ratio of .62 positive evaluations to .38 negative evaluations. Thus, the golden-section
hypothesis represented the mathematically defined, perfect balance of the human
evaluation process, and the dichotomous judgment of the self and others. The authors
supposed that the asymmetrical balance of evaluations was an evolutionary adaptation,
allowing the individual to pay special attention to negative events.
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Following Benjafield and Adams-Webber, Vladimir A. Lefebvre (1985) sought
mathematical support for the golden-section hypothesis that human evaluative cognitions
operate within a mechanism of dichotomized choice with a balance of choosing the
positive pole 62% of the time. Lefebvre used computer and mathematical models of
ethical choice and found evidence that the constant appeared whenever an evaluative
choice between poles was present regardless of what was the subject or object of the
evaluation. According to Lefebvre, the explanation for the constant in the data supported
the existence of a computation mechanism at the base cognitive processes engaged in
evaluation.
Testing the SOM hypothesis in CBT
Schwartz and Garamoni’s SOM research investigated whether the golden-section
could be detected as the optimal balance of negative and positive cognitions. To test this
hypothesis, Schwartz and Garmoni (1986) evaluated the SOM model against aggregated
data from 27 meta-analyses of CBT outcome studies. The majority of the included
studies utilized self-statement questionnaires to measure positive and negative cognitions.
The model to test the golden-section hypothesis within CBT consisted of five categories
of ratio indices. The indices were meant to serve as a discriminatory tool between people
of varying psychological adjustment. The dialogic indices tested were positive dialogue
with a .62 ratio (ranging .56 to .68) that reflected the golden section ratio and presumably
the healthiest balance; the internal dialogue of conflict had symmetrical balance and
therefore a .50 ratio (ranging .45 to .55); the negative dialogue had a ratio of .38
(ranging .32 to .44). The positive and negative monologue indexes were also tested with
ranges of .69 or higher and .37 or lower, respectively.
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The results of the model analyses supported the SOM model but not the exact set
index boundaries. As defined by clinically significant scores on measures of
psychological adjustment, dysfunctional cases had an average ratio of .45. Moreover,
significant differences were noted for several variables between dysfunctional cases and
participants within the positive dialogue range (.56 to .68). These findings supported the
supposition that negative cognitions were a feature of depressed and anxious individuals.
Overall, the study found a relationship between an individual’s functioning to the
quantity of positive versus negative cognitions. Individuals who were functioning better
indicated higher SOM ratios. At the same time, those who suffered clinically significant
distress had SOM ratios within the negative dialogue range. However, the SOM
hypothesis stated that ratios above the golden section value of .62 would indicate
psychological distress, and this was simply not the case. On the contrary, SOM ratios
within the positive monologue range (>.69) were linked to psychological adjustment and
well-being.
Despite somewhat unfavorable findings, a series of studies have appeared that test
the SOM model using Beck’s (Beck & Haight, 2014) constructs of negative automatic
thoughts and positive automatic thoughts. SOM was repeatedly supported as an indicator
of the severity of psychopathology in children and adults. The results of the model
analysis also supported the distinction between healthy and unhealthy SOM ratios.
Overall, emotionally distressed children and adults were found to report significantly
more negative cognitions than the controls (Hogendoorn et al., 2012; Ronan & Kendal,
1997; Kendall et al., 1989).
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The SOM ratios was reported to distinguish between normal and distressed
children, predicting performance or treatment outcomes, and enable tracking of
incremental progress as well as provide information on the mechanism of change by
considering positive, negative cognitions and their relationship to each other. Anxious
children were found to have more negative thoughts than controls, and conversely had
fewer positive thoughts than controls, resulting in lower SOM ratios than controls
(Hogendoorn et al., 2012). Additionally, children identified as anxious had SOM ratios in
the internal dialogue range with an average value ranging from .45 to .47 in both anxiety
specific and depression specific content measures while control subjects’ SOM scores
ranged, on average, between .63 and .65, in both content areas (Ronan & Kendal, 1997).
Research on the SOM was consistent in illustrating the utility of the SOM ratios
for predicting performance or treatment outcomes. Arnkoff et al. (1992) found SOM
ratios to be a stronger predictor of anxiety over self-efficacy measures in a sample of
graduate students before the oral examination. Investigation of whether SOM ratios
would predict the psychotherapeutic change in a sample of depressed patients found that
SOM ratios in pre-treatment positively predicted outcomes beyond the presence of
personality disorder, educational achievement, and severity of depression (Baggett,
1994). In study of a large sample of undergraduates found that the ratio predicted the
difference in the severity of symptoms beyond consideration of exclusively negative or
exclusively positive cognitions, providing further support for the predictive value of
SOM ratios in the application of treatment (Wong, 2010).
When used to track treatment progress, SOM ratios were successful in indicating
individuals who had improved. Additionally, higher SOM ratios were linked to better
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overall outcomes. For example, Schwartz and Michelson (1987) tracked the changes in
the SOM ratio throughout the treatment of patients with agoraphobia. In pre-treatment,
the average SOM ratio for all patients was .437, falling into the negative dialogue range.
By mid-treatment, patients’ average SOM ratio rose to .66, and to .70 at 3-month follow
up. Similar results were found when investigating the shift of SOM ratios in subjects with
agoraphobia before, during, and after treatment. Patients with agoraphobia were
functioning better with higher than expected SOM ratios (.62 or positive dialogue) at the
end of CBT treatment (Michelson et al., 1991). The treatment group was further divided
into high-end state and low-end state groups based on the overall level of improvement
gauged by a decrease in symptoms. The high-end state group’s symptoms decreased by 3
- 4 points, while low-end state group’s symptoms decreased by 0-2 points. At follow-up,
the high-end state group had, on average, a ratio of .817, and the low-end state group had
on the average ratio of .69. Both groups had improvements to the SOM ratio within the
positive monologue range, which is higher than the expected .62 optimal balance ratio.
When investigating a group of depressed patients in treatment, similar results were found
with successful treatment linked to high SOM ratios. Schwartz et al. (2002) divided their
sample of depressed patients into two groups according to whether the individual’s
depression remitted following treatment. At the start of the study, both groups had, on
average, a SOM ratio of .35. Individuals who experienced a substantial reduction in
symptoms following treatment had on average SOM of .74. Subjects who did not attain
significant remission of depression had on average SOM of .41.
However, in predicting treatment progress, the maladaptive quality of high SOM
ratios was repeatedly unsupported. For example, non-anxious children were found to
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have SOM’s on average of .80, while anxious children ranged from .67 to .70
(Hogendoorn et al., 2012). These findings disputed the optimal balance hypothesis, at
least in a sample of children as both anxious and healthy children in this sample had
SOM ratios within the positive monologue range (>.69). In another case, a college
student sample participating in a public speaking class reported SOM ratios averaging .82
on the measure of self-efficacy when in a supportive situation, which was an unexpected finding
if an optimal ratio of .62 were to be found (Davison et al., 1991).

Kendall et al. (1989) found partial support for the SOM model when examining
SOM ratios of normal, depressed, and hypomanic adult subjects. Two sets of these three
groups were used in the study for cross-validation. The subjects in both normal groups
were found to fall within the positive dialogue range (M = .63 and M = .64). The
subjects in both depressed groups scored in the negative dialogue range (M = .45 and M
= .42). The evidence supported the SOM model in differentiating between normal and
depressed subjects. Conversely, the expectation of hypomanic subjects reporting ratios
well above normal subjects was not found. Both groups of hypomanic subjects scored
within the positive dialogue range, the same as the normal subjects. Thus, the hypothesis
that higher SOM end states were maladaptive was unsupported.
The SOM negative dialogue index (ranging .32 to .44) was repeatedly supported
as an indicator of psychopathology in adults and at least one child sample (Kendall,
Howard, & Hays, 1989; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986; Ronan & Kendall, 1997), but the
hypothesis that ratios above .68 correspond to maladaptive states was not confirmed.
Conversely to the optimal balance hypothesis, successful remission of symptoms of
depression or anxiety were accompanied by SOM ratios within the positive dialogue
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range to well into the positive monologue range. Together, the research on the SOM
ratio pointed to a linear relationship between increased protective cognitions and
improved psychological well-being.
Without the affirmation of the optimal balance hypothesis by identifying
psychological distress within the positive monologue range (> .69) as predicted, the SOM
hypothesis. Verifying a nonlinear relationship between positive ratios (>.68) and
adaptation or adjustment is the single most important tenet of the SOM model. The SOM
negative dialogue index (ranging .32 to .44) was supported in several studies as an
indicator of psychopathology (Kendall et al., 1989; Schwartz et al., 2002; Ronan &
Kendall, 1997), but the hypothesis that ratios above .68 correspond to maladaptive states
was not confirmed.
Schwartz (1992) acknowledged the incongruences of the optimal balance view
with evidence in the research. Schwartz proposed that ratios approaching the positive
monologue range were protective for patients from potentially slipping back into a
negatively skewed cognitive balance. Schwartz updated the model in 1997 to include
additional categories and new set points. The refinements necessitated by research
findings moved the indexes of what a balanced ratio was originally (.62) to a range of .63
to .90 (Schwartz, 1997). Schwartz reformulated Balanced State of Mind Model (BSOM)
identifies .62 ratio as a subnormal function with two new designations: .72 ratio as
normal functioning and .81 as optimal functioning. The reformulated BSOM is
comprised of seven qualitatively distinct categories. Negative SOM ratios remained
consistent, as research supported SOM’s ability to differentiate between the severity of
psychopathology. With the BSOM, Schwartz essentially abandoned the golden-section
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ratio as an indicator of optimal balance in favor of the golden-section ratio as a cut-off
point between individuals experiencing distress and those who are functioning normally.
Research studies with the BSOM continued to find further support for the
functionality of high positive ratios. A study of 292 introductory psychology students
found evidence for the protective factor of high SOM ratios (Bruch, 1997). The study
found that individuals who endorsed predominantly positive cognitions were less likely
to be adversely affected by negative life events. In a sample of French college students,
higher SOM ratios (> .69) were associated with lower levels of depression and anxiety,
with 70% of the sample falling within the positive monologue range (Alsaleh et al.,
2015). Moreover, no presence of a curvilinear relationship between SOM ratio and an
individual’s adaptation on various criterion measures was found, suggesting that even
extremely positive states-of-mind are adaptive (Amsel & Fichten, 1998).
Results from several studies suggested that the lower band within the positive
monologue index was adaptive; however, it was acknowledged that the nature of
cognitions assessed to play a role in the breakdown of the balance hypothesis (Schwartz,
1993). Of note, this analysis utilized situation and context-dependent measures like much
of the research on the SOM. Eighteen out of the twenty-seven studies included in the
original 1986 meta-analysis were studies assessing self-statements. Automatic thoughts
and self-statements are contextually and situationally dependent, unlike attitudes, schema,
or beliefs (Beck et al., 1983) and might not be representative of an underlying cognitive
mechanism. On the surface of situational and contextual dependent responses,
individuals may very well function better in the realm of positive bias. However, it is
possible that the positive bias, detectable on the surface, is not reflective of an underlying
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cognitive process, best captured with stable cognitive constructs such as attitudes,
schema, or beliefs.
Evaluating SOM using More stable cognitive constructs, embedded within Ellis’ REBT
Schwartz and Garmoni (1989) hypothesized that the golden-section balance is
operating as a stabilizing cognitive-affective self-regulatory system. A possible barrier to
the SOM in the detection of the golden-section ratio in past research could be the focus
on assessing self-statements rather than more stable cognitive constructs. SOM has
mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts or self-statement, which
represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a person’s emotional
experience (DiGiuseppe et al., 2016). They have not been used with more enduring
cognitive constructs, such as, dysfunctional attitudes, irrational beliefs, or schema.
Additionally, the studies that preceded the SOM theory in testing the golden-section
hypothesis were measuring evaluative components in judgment and thought rather than
self-statements (e.g., Benjafield and Adams-Webber’s character evaluation and
judgments; Lefebvre’s ethical evaluations). REBT’s focus on the evaluative nature of
cognitions fits in with the original formulation of the golden-section hypothesis, which
focused on measuring binary judgments and evaluations (Benjafield & Adams-Webber,
1976; Lefebvre, 1985). One might find good support for the SOM golden-section
hypothesis within an REBT framework by examining stable, evaluative aspects of beliefs
rather than self-statements.
In 1958, Abelson and Rosenberg (1958) introduced the terms “hot and cold”
cognitions to differentiate between cognitive constructs. They theorized that internal
states (e.g., cognitions, beliefs etc.) are of two types: ones that process facts from the
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outside world, which they termed cold cognitions, and those that form evaluations of
what is happening in the outside world, which they called hot cognitions. The
differentiation of knowledge-based and evaluation-based thoughts lends itself to different
assessments. As mentioned above, measurements of automatic thoughts or selfstatements might not capture deep cognitions that are likely to be related to evaluative or
‘hot” cognitions and be more sensitive to perceived facts that are not evaluations.
SOM paradigm was applied to affective/emotional states. Findings with affect
mirrored the results of positive and negative cognition studies. SOM ratios were
effectively adapted to measures of affect where the quantity or ratio of positive and
negative affective states would coincide with psychopathology. Garamoni et al. (1991)
found that affective ratio of 39 depressed males balanced at the same level as cognitions
of depressed patients with a ratio in the negative dialogue range of .35. Normal controls
in this study averaged an affect ration of .78. Garmoni et al. (1992) examined the shift in
affective and cognitive SOM ratios of 32 depressed patients receiving CBT treatment.
The sample was divided into two groups, responders and non-responders which was
determined by independent clinical ratings. The two groups did not differ on any
demographic characteristics or the severity of symptoms before treatment. The pretreatment affective ratio for both groups was .34. The average affective ratio for
responders was .65, while the average affective ratio for non-responders was .35,
indicating no change from pre-treatment. These findings reflected a similar pattern
within affective ratios as was found in the ratios for thoughts of individuals in
psychotherapeutic treatment.
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All cognitive psychotherapies generally hold theoretical underpinning about how
humans’ processing of information on their emotions and behavior (DiGiuseppe et al.,
2016). Ellis’ REBT approaches the change process in psychotherapy by focusing on
replacing more stable, hot cognitions, or irrational beliefs with rational beliefs and getting
the individual to practice their newly formed rational beliefs. Within the REBT
framework, the focus is on targeting the evaluative component of the cognitions as the
primary driver of emotional and behavioral upset (DiGiuseppe & Doyle, 2019), and as
such, the assessment measures in REBT tap into evaluative, deep “hot” cognitions.
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Chapter III
Research Questions
In the current study, we will examine the SOM model within the REBT
framework. We hypothesize that by assessing stable cognitive constructs, such as IBs
and RBs within the REBT framework, we might find support for the SOM golden-section
(optimal balance) hypothesis. To test the golden-section hypothesis within the REBT
framework, we applied the SOM ratios to data on an adult sample who have completed
the DRLG, a measure irrational and rational beliefs within the REBT framework
(DiGiuseppe et al, 2018). The SOM ratios derived from the DRLG were tested within
the paradigm of the model and correlated with measures of psycho-emotional dysfunction
and adjustment.
We hypothesize that:
1. RB and IB SOM ratios will replicate previous findings of differentiating
between healthy and unhealthy subjects, as indicated by self-reports of
psychological distress.
2. IBs will have a strong positive correlation with measures of disturbance;
and will have a weak negative correlation with measures of life
satisfaction.
3. RBs will have a strong positive correlation with measures of life
satisfaction and will have a weak negative correlation with measures of
psychological distress.
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4. IB and RB SOM ratios will replicate findings from previous research in
that the ratios higher predictive value of psychological distress and life
satisfaction beyond either IBs or RBs alone.
5. We hypothesize that there will be a curvilinear relationship between
belief SOM ratios and measures of life satisfaction and psychological
distress.
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Chapter IV
Methods
Participants
Participants in this study were collected via an online survey. The survey was
distributed through social groups on a social media outlet (Facebook) and the Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. The total sample consisted of 258 participants
between the ages of 18 to 84 years old. The percentage of participants within each age
range is reported in Figure 1. The sample was relatively evenly split between males
(44.3%) and female participants (55.2%) (N= 212, Missing 46, 17.8%). The sample was
well educated, with 72.7 percent earning a four-year college degree or higher. Figure 2
lists the percentage of participants in each category of educational attainment. The
sample ethnicity was largely Caucasian (73.6%); all ethnicities are reported in Figure 3.
Participants were largely residing within the United States (59.5 %), with two
percent residing in South America and India, and thirty-eight percent choosing not to give
their location. In terms of marital status, most of the sample was in a relationship (15.6%)
or married (53.3%). Single participants made up the third-largest group (24.5%), and the
remainder of the sample was either divorced/separated (4.2%), widowed (2.4%), or chose
not to respond (17.8%). We did not recruit participants from any clinical sample;
however, we recognize that any sample recruited non-clinical group will have a certain
proportion that are receiving mental health services. Therefore, participants were also
asked of their treatment status, with nine percent indicating that they were participating in
psychotherapy and four percent indicating participation in a drug/alcohol dependence
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treatment. In terms of psychotropic medication, ten percent (23 individuals) of
participants indicated that they were currently prescribed psychotropic medication.
Figure 1
Demographics: Age. (n = 220)

Figure 2
Demographics: Ethnicity. (n = 212)
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Figure 3
Demographics: Educational Attainment. (n – 173)

Chi-square test of independence was performed to examine whether samples from
the two sources differed on any demographic measures. A total of 221 participants fully
completed the demographic data with 86 participants from the MTurk pool and 132
participants from the Facebook pool. The two samples did not differ on measures of
gender, X2(3, n = 221) = 6.64, p = .08; ethnicity, X2(6, n = 221) = 9.07, p = .17;
education, X2(6, n = 221) = 5.95, p = .43; country, X2(77, n = 221) = 71.95, p = .64;
marital status, X2(5, n = 221) = 7.36, p = .19. The samples did however differ in age,
X2(7, n = 221) = 22.40, p < .01, with MTurk participants being overall younger (92% of
the sample younger than 54 years-of-age) than Facebook participants (70.4% of the
sample younger than 54 years-of-age).
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Procedure
Data for this study were collected from two sources, first the distribution of an
electronic survey via social media, and second by recruiting on for participants on
MTurk. The social media outlet allowed for the survey to be posted to mental health
disorder support groups and other nonclinical communities on Facebook and as well as
larger communities to capture the greatest variance of well-being and psychopathology.
Our participants were recruited via Facebook groups (e.g., Depression Support, Mental
Illness Awareness, Its an Aquarius Thing). The pages’ administrators were sent a private
message asking for permission to post a survey link. When permission was granted, the
administrator of the page was sent a written introduction to the study as well as the link to
the survey, which they were free to post on the page. Social media sites, such as
Facebook, have been shown as an effective and ethical recruitment tool (Kosinski et al.,
2015). Participants reached through social media completed the survey at will. Two
hundred and five participants began the survey via social media outlet of which onehundred seventy-two were retained. In order to retain a survey completed via Facebook,
the participant must have completed at least one section of the survey. A section of the
survey demarcates a scale. Additionally, each participant's responses were evaluated for
missing data. It was judged that a 3-4 percent of missing data within each section of the
survey were permissible. The missing data was treated through mean substitution
methods.
MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace that makes it possible to reach
participants for tasks, such as, survey participation. Each MTurk participant was
awarded a small fee for their time. To test for inattentive responders, a validity question
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was embedded within the survey as recommended by Oppenheimer et al. (2009). All
responses of participants who failed the attention check were removed from the data set.
One hundred eighty-two people opened the survey on MTurk, and eighty-six were
retained.
Measures
The electronic survey consisted of several measures, including demographic
information, DRLG – short form, Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire, and
Satisfaction with Life Scale.
The DRLG is an abbreviated version of the Attitudes and Belief Scale -2
(DiGiuseppe, Raptis, Gorman, Agiurgioaei-Boie, Agiurgioaei, Leaf, & Robin, 2020) that
assessed RBs and IBs reflecting the most recent theory of Ellis’ Rational Emotive
Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994). The DRLG – short form was developed by
DiGiuseppe, Robin, Leaf, and Gorman (2020). The DRLG – short form consists of 24
items within a 4 x 2 x 3 matrix. The measure consists of 4 irrational cognitive process
subscales measuring Demandingness (DEM), Frustration-Intolerance (FI), Awfulizing
AWF), and Self-Condemnation (SC), and four rationally worded cognitive process
subscales measuring Non-Demanding Preferences (NDP), Frustration Tolerance (FT),
Realistic Negative Evaluations(RNE), and Self-Acceptance. Each of these eight
subscales consists of three items, one from each context domains of achievement,
affiliation, and comfort.
The DRLG has excellent internal consistency and correlates significantly with a
measure of psychopathology (DiGiuseppe, Raptis, Gorman, Agiurgioaei-Boie,
Agiurgioaei, Leaf, & Robin, 2020). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for an 8-factor model
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matches the 8 subscales mentioned above. A hierarchical model – has the four irrational
scales load on to a second-order irrationality factor, and the four rationally worded
subscales loading on to a rationality second-order factor. Thus, the DRLG short form
yields a Total Irrationality and Total Rationality score and eight subscales. DRLG –
short form has shown good to excellent internal consistency and concurrent validity with
measures of mental health.
Amsel and Fichten (1998) recommend that when calculating SOM ratios, a scale
for deriving ratios must have a value of zero to capture the broadest possible range of
ratios between 0 and 1. The DRLG scoring already included a zero point and thus reflects
the broadest possible range for belief SOM ratios within this sample.
The Belief SOM ratio for each participant was calculated by dividing their total
rationality score by the total score [rational belief / (rational+ irrational beliefs)]. Indexes
from the original formulation of the SOM hypothesis were used to compare belief SOM
ratios to previous research. Average SOM ratios were calculated for the entire sample.
Additionally, the sample was grouped based on PDSQ scale cut-offs scores within the
depression and generalized anxiety indexes. Participants endorsing more symptoms than
the cut-off score for each index were grouped as ‘unhealthy,’ while participants
endorsing fewer symptoms than the cut-off score were grouped as ‘healthy.’ Average
SOM ratios were calculated for each group within the two indexes: depression and
anxiety.
The Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire (PDSQ: Zimmerman &
Mattia, 2001) is a self-report screening assessment of psychiatric disorders. The PDSQ
was developed to screen for the most common psychological disorders found in
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outpatient mental health settings. The measure consists of 126 questions assessing
symptoms within five diagnostic areas: eating disorder, mood disorders, anxiety
disorders, substance use disorders, and somatoform disorders with an additional 6-item
psychosis screener. The PDSQ has shown excellent internal consistency, test-retest
reliability, concurrent validity, and discriminant validity (Zimmerman & Mattia, 2001).
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS: Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin,
1985) is a self-reported measure of global life satisfaction. SWLS consists of 5-items
using a 1 through 7 Likert scale. The total score is calculated by summing all the 5 items.
The total score can fall into one of six categories: highly satisfied, high score, average
score, slightly below average score, dissatisfied, and extremely dissatisfied. SWLS has
been shown to have excellent internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent
validity (Pavot, Diener, Colven & Sandvik, 1991).
The participants completed a demographic questionnaire that asked them to
identify their age range, gender, level of educational attainment, and the country/state of
their residence. Participants were also asked about their marital status and the gender of
their partner. Additionally, participants volunteered whether they were currently in
treatment with the option to provide the type of treatment, cause of treatment, and
whether they were prescribed psychotropic medication. The demographic information of
the sample is reported above. Additionally, twenty-three participants provided their
positive treatment status, with eight participants report the type and cause of treatment.
One hundred and eighty-nine participants reported that they were not in treatment, and 47
participants chose not to respond. Twenty- five participants volunteered that they were
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currently taking psychotropic medication with one hundred eighty-six participants
reporting no psychotropic medication. Forty-seven participants chose not to reply.
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Chapter V
Results
The sample was reviewed for means (M) and standard deviations (SD), reported
in Table 1, on belief SOM ratio, Rationality and Irrationality total scores, as well as
variables of psychological stress (PDSQ Total score) and life satisfaction (SWLS Total
Score). When compared to mean total scores of a clinical sample (M = 35.7, SD = 22.01)
the sample was relatively free of psychological disorders t(226) = -7.71, p < .01 (M =
23.4, SD = 24) (Perkey, Sinclair, Blais, Stein, Neal, Pierson, and Slavin-Mulford, 2018).
When compared to mean total scores of the validation sample (M = 23.5, SD = 6.4), the
sample was just as satisfied with life, t(258) = -1.4, p = .16 (M = 22.8, SD = 7.8) (Diener,
et.al.,1985). Similarly, the sample mean for rational beliefs total score was higher (M =
34.1, SD = 9.3) than the sample mean for irrational beliefs total score (M = 18.5, SD =
12.3).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Belief SOM ratio, Rationality, and Irrationality
Total Scores, Variables of Psychological Stress, and Life Satisfaction.
Variables
Mean
SD
SOM ratio

.66

.21

RB total score

34.1

9.4

IB total score

18.5

12.3

PDSQ total score

23.4

24.0

SWLS total Score

22.8

7.7

Note: RB = DRLG Rational beliefs; IB = DRLG Irrational beliefs;
PDSQ = Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire (Normative sample M =
35.7)(n=226); SWLS = Satisfaction
with Life Scale (Normative sample M = 23.5).
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To determine the internal consistency of the DRLG-short form for this sample,
Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated. The analysis indicated DRLG – short form to possess
a high level of internal consistency for this sample (α = .95). The sample mean for belief
SOM ratio was M = .66, SD = .21, falling within the positive dialogue range of the
originally theorized range for optimal functioning.
The belief SOM ratios were consistent in differentiating between participants
experiencing psychological distress and those who did not report psychological distress.
SOM ratio dependently identified participants who met criteria for elevated symptoms of
depression (PDSQ-Depression > 9) and anxiety (PDSQ-Anxiety >7) with an average
belief SOM ratio falling within the negative dialogue range to conflict range (Depression
M = .46, SD = .15; Anxiety M = .50, SD = .19). While participants without symptoms
(below clinical cut-off), evidenced belief SOM ratios within the normal range
(Depression M = .74, SD = .18; Anxiety M = .71, SD = .20). When examining total
psychological distress scores (PDSQ Total Score) SOM ratios reflected a similar split
between participants with subclinical to clinical psychological distress (T score >60).
Participants reporting clinical levels of psychological distress had on average SOM ratios
within negative dialogue range (M = .44, SD .13). On the other hand, participants
reporting sub-clinical psychological distress had SOM ratios within the positive dialogue
range (M = .69, SD = .20). Interestingly, when examining the range of SOM ratio scores
for total psychological distress markers, participants reporting clinical levels of
psychological distress ranged between .08 and .65. In contrast, those without significant
psychological distress ranged from .04 to 1.00 SOM ratio values. The difference in range
for the two groups may be indicative of higher levels of irrationality present for the
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participants with lower SOM ratios (as in the index of negative dialogue or internal
dialogue of conflict).
To test our second and third hypotheses, we correlated rational and irrational
beliefs to the measures of psychological stress (PDSQ), and life satisfaction (SWLS)
reported in Table 2. Self-reported psychological stress was significantly positively
correlated to irrational beliefs, r (226) = .65, p < .01. Self-reported psychological stress
was significantly negatively correlated to rational beliefs, r (226) = -.47, p < .01.
Conversely, self-reported life satisfaction was significantly positively correlated to
rational beliefs, r (258) = .52, p < .01, and significantly negatively correlated to irrational
beliefs, r (258) = -.43, p < .01.
Table 2
Correlations Between Rational and Irrational Beliefs with Measures of Psychological
Stress and Life Satisfaction.
Measures
1
2
3
4
1. RB

-

2. IB

-.70**

-

3. PDSQ

-.47**

.65**

-

4. SWLS

.52**

-.43**

-.41**

-

Note: RB = DRLG Rational beliefs; IB = DRLG Irrational beliefs;
PDSQ = Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire; SWLS = Satisfaction
with Life Scale.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

To test our fourth hypothesis, we entered belief SOM ratios with total irrational
beliefs score and total rational belief scores into a hierarchal regression to determine
incremental validity of belief SOM ratio, irrational beliefs ,and rational beliefs in
predicting psychological well-being (SWLS Total Score) and psychological distress
(PDSQ Total Score). The results of the hierarchal multiple regression of predicting
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psychological well-being are described in Table 3. Rational beliefs were a significant
predictor of life satisfaction and explained 28% of the variance, F(2, 257) = 50.00, p <
.0005, R2 = .28. Belief SOM ratios did not add predictive value beyond rational beliefs
( = .35, p = .42). Similarly, irrational beliefs did not add predictive value above rational
beliefs ( = .11, p = .36). The results of the hierarchal multiple regression analysis of
predicting psychological distress are described in Table 4. Irrational beliefs were a
significant predictor of psychological distress and explained 42% of the variance, F(2,
225) = 81.01, p < .0005, R2 = .42. Belief SOM ratios did not add predictive value beyond
irrational beliefs ( = .19, p = .45). Rational beliefs did not add predictive value above
irrational beliefs ( = -.05, p = .78).
Table 3
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Variables Predicting Life Satisfaction.

Step Predictor

Unstandardized
coefficients

Standardized
coefficients

B



SE B

p

1
Belief SOM

18.86

2.04

.50

.25

R2
change
.25

.28

.03

50.00

.00

.28

.00

33.28

.73

R2

F

p

85.53

.00

.00

2
Belief SOM

7.37

3.98

.19

.06

Rationality

.29

.09

.35

.00

3
Belief SOM

13.12

16.20

.35

.42

Rationality

.25

.15

.30

.09

Irrationality

.07

.19

.11

.71

N = 258. SE = Standard Error. Irrationality = Total irrational belief score on the DRLG
short form. Rationality = Total rational belief score on the DRLG short form.
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Table 4
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Variables Predicting Psychological
Distress (N = 225)

Step Predictor

Unstandardized
coefficients

Standardized
coefficients

B



SE B

p

1
Belief SOM

-70.18

5.99

-.62

.38

R2
F
change
.38
137.10

.42

.03

81.01

.00

.42

.00

53.81

.78

R2

p
.00

.00

2
Belief SOM

9.66

20.88

.09

.64

Irrationality

1.41

.35

.73

.00

3
Belief SOM

21.63

47/74

.19

.65

Irrationality

1.54

.58

.80

.01

Rationality -.12
.43
-.05
.78
N = 225. SE = Standard Error. Irrationality = Total irrational belief score on the DRLG
short form. Rationality = Total rational belief score on the DRLG short form.
We also investigated whether the order in which variables were entered into the
hierarchal multiple regression analysis would change the significance of the predictive
variables. We completed a secondary regression analysis by inputting the variables in
reverse order and got the same results with RBs predicting life satisfaction and IBs
predicting psychopathology.
To test our final hypothesis, we ran a set of regression models with belief SOM
ratios as a predictor of life satisfaction (SWLS Total score). We fit the data to linear,
quadratic, and cubic regression and judged the best fit model with the least error (Figure
4). Linear model fit was statistically significant explaining 25% of the variance, F(1,
256) = 85.53, p < .0005, R2 = .25. The quadratic model fit was statistically significant,
explaining 26% of variance, F(2, 255) = 44.86, p < .0005, R2 = .26, but did not add
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explanatory power beyond the linear model ( = -.54, p = .07). The cubic model fit was
statistically significant F(3, 254) = 29.81, p < .0005, R2 = .26 but did not add explanatory
power as the best model fit ( = .26, p = .82). We also ran a set of regression models with
belief SOM ratios as a predictor of psychological distress (PDSQ Total score). We fit the
data to linear, quadratic, and cubic regression and judged the best fit model with the least
error (Figure 5). Linear model fit was statistically significant explaining 38% of
variance, F(1, 224) = 137.10, p < .0005, R2 = .38). The quadratic model fit was
statistically significant, explaining 38% of variance, F(2, 223) = 69.10, p < .0005, R2
= .38, but did not carry explanatory power beyond the linear model ( = - .29, p = .30).
The cubic model fit was statistically significant, explaining 40 percent of the variance
F(3, 222) = 51.05, p < .0005, R2 = .40, and did add explanatory power beyond the other
two models ( = 3.26, p = .002).
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Figure 4
Curve Model Fit for the Interaction Between Endorsement of Life Satisfaction and Belief
SOM Ratios.
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Figure 5
Curve Model Fit for the Interaction Between Endorsement of Psychological Stress and
Belief SOM Ratios.
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Chapter VI
Discussion
The original 1986 SOM theory proposed that individuals balance their positive
and negative cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation system
represented with a ratio [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions) (Schwartz
& Garamoni, 1986; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). The authors supposed that the
asymmetrical balance of evaluations was an evolutionary adaptation, allowing the
individual to pay special attention to negative events. However, research on the model
established that the optimal ratio first proposed as .62 was incorrect, as many
psychologically well-adapted individuals were functioning within higher ranges of the
ratio. As a result, Schwartz reformulated the original SOM theory into the Balanced
State of Mind Model (BSOM), identifying the .62 ratio as a subnormal function with two
new designations: 0.72 ratio as the normal functioning set point, and .81 as the optimal
functioning set point. We hypothesized that the optimal ratio was not founded due to
characteristics of measurement used in previous research, namely self-statements.
Instead, we proposed that the optimal ratio may be found when examining the theory
using more stable constructs, such as irrational and rational beliefs embedded within the
cognitive therapy of Albert Ellis: Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis
1994). Overall, we found that an optimal ratio was not substantiated when examining the
SOM theory within the REBT framework. Our findings indicate individuals predictably
experience less psychological distress the more rational and less irrational are their
beliefs.
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First, it was important for us to establish the relationship rational and irrational
beliefs have with measures of psychopathology and well-being in order to relate beliefs
to outcomes the same way negative and positive cognitions have been linked to outcomes
in past research. For example, previous research had shown a clear link between negative
(contributing) cognitions and psychopathology and positive (protective) cognitions and
well-being (Beck, 1963; Beevers, Wells, & Miller 2007; Chakhssi, et al., 2018; Teasdale,
1983). This study had found that rational and irrational beliefs are linked to measures of
psychological adjustment. Furthermore, the beliefs correlated in the predicted direction.
The current investigation demonstrated irrational beliefs to significantly positively
correlated to measures of psychopathology and significantly negatively correlated with
measures of life satisfaction. While rational beliefs were significantly positively
correlated with measures of life satisfaction and significantly negatively correlated to
measures of psychopathology. These findings help us link rational and irrational beliefs
to measures of psychological adjustment in the same way negative and positive
cognitions have been linked to outcome measures in previous research.
Next, we investigated the SOM ratios derived from rational and irrational beliefs.
Average SOM ratios for the overall sample fell within the positive dialogue range based
on original SOM indices but were different from the optimal ratio balance set point
of .62. Since our sample was relatively free of psychological stress and satisfaction with
life we would expect the overall sample’s mean SOM ratio to reflect the perfect balance
hypothesis. However, the sample mean for the SOM ratio was higher. When further
investigated, individuals who were more satisfied with life and less plagued by
psychological distress had SOM ratios congruent to normal functioning setpoints
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proposed within the BSOM. These findings replicate previous research when
investigating negative and positive cognitions. As such, our hypothesis was refuted that
finding the optimal balance may be resolved by assessing stable cognitive constructs,
such as, attitudes and beliefs within the REBT framework. Research has consistently
shown, including current investigation, that many healthy individuals have much higher
ratios than the hypothesized optimal balance ratio of .62. These findings hold true both
when measuring self-statements and when measuring beliefs.
We also noted a specific difference in the range of SOM ratios between
individuals endorsing clinical levels of depression and anxiety versus those who reported
fewer symptoms. In our sample, participants who endorsed sub-clinical levels of
depression and anxiety, on average, endorsed more rational beliefs than irrational beliefs,
as represented by higher SOM ratios for this group of participants (positive monologue
range). Conversely, participants who endorsed more irrational beliefs than rational
beliefs (negative dialogue range) also endorsed clinical levels of psychological distress
(depression and anxiety) and had lower SOM ratios than the healthy participants. The
same held true of the average SOM ratios when participants were split according to their
endorsement of overall psychological distress. As such, belief SOM ratios were able to
differentiate between healthy and unhealthy participants. Additionally, these findings
support the assertion that negative (contributory) mental states as represented by lower
SOM ratios (as in the index of negative dialogue or internal dialogue of conflict) and are
linked to higher levels of psychological distress.
Our findings supported previous research in consistently finding SOM ratios to
differentiate between unhealthy and healthy groups. Nasby and Russel (1997) reported
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that soldiers with PTSD were differentiated from soldiers who did not experience PTSD
by their SOM ratios when holding combat exposure and pre- and post-service variables
constant. Soldiers with PTSD reported SOMs within the negative monologue range (.35)
while non-PTSD counterparts reported SOMs within the positive dialogue range (.68).
Moreover, Ronan and Kendall (1997) argued in support of the use of SOM ratios as it
distinguished between normal and distressed children, enabling tracking of incremental
progress as well as providing information on the mechanism of change by considering
positive, negative cognitions and their relationship to each other. As such our findings
reaffirm that the SOM ratio may be applied to any number of assessment tools that
employ both negative and positive aspects of a content area in order to track treatment
progress.
When investigating negative and positive cognitions SOM was consistent in
illustrating the utility of the SOM ratios for predicting performance or treatment
outcomes. Baggett (1994) investigated whether SOM ratios would predict a
psychotherapeutic change in a sample of depressed patients. The study found that SOM
ratios in pre-treatment positively predicted outcomes beyond the presence of personality
disorder, educational achievement, and severity of depression. Another study of a large
sample of undergraduates found that the ratio predicted the difference in the severity of
symptoms beyond consideration of exclusively negative or exclusively positive
cognitions, providing further support for the predictive value of SOM ratios in the
application of treatment (Wong, 2010).
Furthermore, Bruch et al. (1991) examined the predictive power of SOM ratios
for a sample of patients with social phobia undergoing CBT. The authors argued for the
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SOM as an empirically testable model that enables practitioners and researchers to
capture the processes of cognitive shifts in psychotherapy. Accordingly, research
supported the dynamic relationship (SOM ratios) of negative and positive cognitions as a
stronger predictive of outcome measure than positive and negative cognitions alone.
For this reason, we aimed to investigate whether belief SOM ratios would predict
psychological distress or well-being. Conversely, our study found that within the REBT
framework, IBs were a stronger predictor of psychological distress than rational beliefs or
SOM ratios and RBs were a stronger predictor of life satisfaction. SOM ratios, when
compared to IBs and RBs, did not add explanatory power. As such, irrationality has been
found as the stronger predictor of psychological distress in our sample and rationality was
found as the stronger predictor of life satisfaction. However, our study did not track
change over time as did the aforementioned investigation, which may have affected our
findings. We propose that the dynamic relationship of contributing and protective
elements over the course of treatment may be a stronger predictor of overall outcome,
while irrational beliefs may be a stronger predictor as an initial measure of psychological
distress. We believe more research is warranted to examine this hypothesis by using
SOM ratios derived from beliefs to track treatment progress.
Previous research supported a linear relationship between SOM ratio and an
individual’s adaptation on various criterion measures, suggesting that even extremely
positive states-of-mind are adaptive (Amsel & Fichten, 1998). The current study found
the best model fit for a linear relationship between SOM ratios and measures of wellbeing. Our investigation of the link between belief SOM ratios and psychopathology
indicated a linear relationship to have the best model fit. These findings point affirm the
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previously support a linear relationship between RBs and IBs outcome measures of life
satisfaction and psychological distress. Our lack of finding the curvilinear relationship
between psychological well-being and rationality supported previous findings when the
SOM model was tested within the CBT theory.
Future Research
Our research findings support the original formulation of Schwartz and
Garamoni’s (1986, 1989) work in that individuals balance their cognitive states
asymmetrically. Research findings of an optimal balance approximating the golden
section ratio have been inconsistent. However, the findings of the asymmetry in the
balance of individuals’ cognitive experience have been consistent. It may be proposed
that little negative experience is needed for adaptive salience against the backdrop of
mostly positive mental events. And so, the theory does reflect the adaptive quality for the
salience of internal negative states against the backdrop of primarily positive internal
states.
Overall, SOM has been shown useful in differentiating between levels of severity
of symptoms and tracking people’s progress in therapy relative to others. Additionally,
the SOM possesses concurrent validity useful in distinguishing clinical versus normal
groups and can serve to compare groups between therapies and disorders in a
standardized way. SOM ratios are a great way to explore the complex relationships
between self-reported beliefs or cognitions in the attempt to understand the dynamic
relationships of thoughts and beliefs as contributory outcome factors.
Amsel and Fichten (1998) named several advantages for using ratio scores
namely that ratios simplify data analysis by avoiding working with positively skewed
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distributions and overcomplicated statistical operations while allowing for comparison of
different evaluation methods. The authors offered several suggestions to refine the
accuracy of SOM by including a zero point on the scale of self-statement inventories or
converting existing scores to have a zero value. SOM ratios allow for comparison across
methodologies and studies. The authors made a strong argument for reporting both SOM
scores and frequencies of valanced statements. The study found that frequencies of
valanced thought and SOM ratios yield different information. The authors asserted that
different frequencies of negative and positive statements could yield the same overall
score, while a ratio score relates the relative balance of positive to negative cognitions or
affect serving as a more accurate barometer of change in the valence of cognitions
throughout psychotherapeutic treatment.
Understanding the role of positive and negative cognitions in psychological
adjustment is an essential aspect of CBT practice. The current study enabled us to
explore further the dynamic relationship between irrational and rational beliefs and their
interaction with psychopathology. Future research may focus on identifying, particularly
where the breakdown from healthy to un-healthy balance begins. By investigating a set
cut-off may enable for identification of individuals with a strong need for intervention as
well as formalize treatment progress across treatment paradigms. The current
investigation’s findings are incongruent with previous research of the nonlinear
relationship between SOM ratios and well-being. Further exploration of the nonlinear
relationship between SOM ratios and measures of well-being is warranted to replicate or
refute this finding.
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Limitations
The greatest limitation of the current study was the make-up of the sample. The
sample underrepresented minority populations when compared to U.S. Census population
statistics. The latest U.S. census recorded 60% of the population as Caucasian, 12% as
Black, 18 percent as Hispanic, 1% as American Indian, and 6% as Asian (Census
Bureau’s Community Survey, 2008-2018). Secondly, our sample was relatively well
educated. According to the Census Bureau’s website, just 32.2 percent of the U.S.
population over the age of 18 holds a 4-year college degree or higher. Our sample
consisted of 68.3 percent of participants who reported earning a 4-year college degree or
higher.
Furthermore, our sample was relatively free of psychological distress and
relatively satisfied with life as compared to means from validating studies of these
measures. As such, our sample might not be representative of the population in terms of
education, ethnic, and racial background, as well as relative well-being. These
exceptions may have arisen from sampling bias using social media outlets and MTurk
survey participants.
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Chapter VII
Implication for the Practice of School Psychology
An estimate of 13 - 20 % of children in the U.S. are effected by mental health
disorders (CDC, 2018). The majority of children with mental health disorders do not
receive treatment. However, the majority of those children who do receive mental health
services, access these services in a school setting (USDHHS, 1999). Some meta-analytic
studies have supported the use of counseling and psychotherapy as an effective mental
health service for children in schools, with some interventions working better than others
(Prout & Prout, 1998; Reese, Prout, Zirkelback & Anderson, 2010; Whiston, Wendi Lee,
Rahardja & Eder, 2011). Additionally, school psychologists’ training uniquely places
them in a position to be able to choose evidence-based counseling and psychotherapy
interventions with consideration for student’s individual needs, strengths, and weaknesses
(Hughes & Theodore, 2009).
Current trends and initiatives in education have highlighted the importance of
establishing accountability by empirically evaluating programs and interventions at all
levels of service delivery in schools (Dimmitt, 2009). Large caseloads, assignments to
multiple schools as well as a focus on identification of children for special education
services are all variables constraining school psychologists from engaging in the
provision of direct mental health services to students (Hanchon & Fernald, 2013). Efforts
to ease the delivery of evidence-based psychotherapeutic treatment may contribute to
increasing the school psychologists’ role in providing mental health services in school.
One way to ease the burden on school psychologists is to have an assessment tool
that can cut across interventions, and specific problems addressed while remaining
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empirically accountable for treatment progress. Utilizing the SOM model may provide an
assessment system with any tool consisting of dichotomous measurement (i.e. positivenegative thoughts; positive-negative affect; rational-irrational beliefs), which may be
sensitive to the constraints within mental health service provision in schools while
responsive to the necessity of monitoring treatment.
The current study further established the ability of the SOM model to be applied
across measures of cognition, affect, and beliefs when both protective and contributing
factors are assessed. The importance of the SOM model in the practice of school
psychology is in the model’s ability to conform to any assessment tool which delineates
between positive and negative poles, whether it measures cognition, affect, or beliefs.
Our findings reaffirm that the SOM ratio may be applied to any number of assessment
tools that employ both negative and positive aspects of a content area to identify
individuals who are experiencing heightened psychological distress. Moreover, SOM
ratios can be applied as a tool for tracking treatment progress as the ratio allows for
incremental monitoring in the rise of protective cognitions or beliefs (Schwartz &
Michelson, 1987; Schwartz et al., 2002).
Limitations remain in the transfer of SOM ratio use with adults to a population of
children in school. For example, Hogendoorn et al. found that anxious children reported
more negative thoughts than controls, had less positive thoughts than controls, and had
lower SOM ratios than controls. Additionally, both positive and negative thoughts
predicted anxiety levels in normal children. The study found that non-anxious children
had SOM’s on average of .80 while anxious children ranged from .67 to .70. Although
the study supported the idea that quantities of protective and contributing cognitions
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differ between anxious and normal children in particular ways, the exact set points as an
average of a group were unclear. Further research is necessary to establish whether the
difference in SOM ratios between anxious/depressed children is significantly different
from children not experiencing psychological distress.
The current study has aided in reviewing and extending the present research base
to bolster future research with the SOM as it is applied both in clinical and school
settings. Previous research on SOM ratios when evaluating children has been sparse.
Many more studies are necessary to understand the interaction and the dynamic
relationship between protective and contributing factors affecting children’s
psychological balance. The model’s ability to conform to different assessment and
treatment paradigms must be further explored with samples of healthy and
psychologically distressed children within the school setting.
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